Legal Restrictions on American Access to Foreign Cultural Property by Blass, Michael S.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 46 Issue 6 Article 5 
1978 
Legal Restrictions on American Access to Foreign Cultural 
Property 
Michael S. Blass 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael S. Blass, Legal Restrictions on American Access to Foreign Cultural Property, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 
1177 (1978). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol46/iss6/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON AMERICAN ACCESS TO
FOREIGN CULTURAL PROPERTY
I. INTRODUCTION
Artistic and ethnological objects always have been valued as important
records of human accomplishment.' In modern times, cultural property 2 has
taken on an even greater significance, for more than ever cultural property
has become an active object of financial investment. 3 The growing interna-
tional demand for cultural property has brought about an alarming increase in
the looting and destruction of cultural sites around the world.4 Archaeological
remains, national monuments, art galleries, temples and churches are all
falling prey to thieves eager to meet the demands of an insatiable market.
This situation, described by one scholar as the "murder of man's history," s
has become the subject of legislation throughout the world. 6
In recent decades, scores of countries have enacted unilateral restrictions on
the acquisition of cultural property within their borders. 7 Many countries,
including the United States, have entered into bilateral and multilateral
agreements designed to limit the trafficking in important cultural materials.
These growing restraints on the international exchange of art have raised the
important question of who shall control the right to possess cultural property.
The resolution of this question involves the balancing of two conflicting
considerations. On the one hand, the artifacts of past civilizations are the
"legitimate heritage of all mankind and not just of those states currently
occupying the physical sites of early cultures."8 On the other hand, modern
1. See Bernal, Protection of National Treasures, 68 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 117, 119 (1974).
2. Cultural property is a generic term referring to all types of artistic, archaeological, and
ethnological material.
3. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1977, § 2, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1973, at 1, col. 3.
Pre-Columbian artifacts can sell for over $75,000 in New York. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1973, at 1,
col. 1, at 34, col. 1.
4. H.R. Rep. No. 824, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1972). The sudden decline about 900 A.D. of
the prodigious Mayan civilization in Central America continues to be one of the great mysteries of
human civilization. Many of the important clues to this mystery have been obliterated by the
clandestine art trade. Looters leave many archaeological sites a pile of rubble by hacking up large
limestone slabs, called stelae, that contain key hieroglyphic and decorative carvings. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 26, 1973, at 1, col. 2; Wall St. J., June 2, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
5. Wall St. J., June 2, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
6. For a discussion of the various types of protective legislation around the world, see NieE,
Legislative Models of Protection of Cultural Property, 27 Hastings L.J. 1089 (1976). For an
extensive listing of these national treasury laws, see L. DuBoff, Deskbook of Art Law 1008-71
(1977).
7. See notes 25-30 infra and accompanying text.
8. A Bill To Implement the United Nations Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. Hearings
on H.R. 5643 Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings] (statement of Mr. Emmerich as
presented by Mr. Ewing).
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nations, especially the art-rich countries of the Third World, have an impor-
tant stake in fostering a proud cultural heritage. 9 Any effective plan for
controlling the flow of art will have to accommodate both sides of the issue.
This Comment will present the problems inherent in the regulation of the
trade in cultural property and trace the development of the United States'
response to these problems. Two important and recent developments will be
discussed in particular. The first is a federal court of appeals decision10
involving the application of stolen property laws to the importation of cultural
artifacts declared to be the national property of the Mexican Government.
The second is a bill proposed in Congress" and recently passed by the House
of Representatives that will enable the executive branch to impose, at its
discretion, broad restrictions on the importation of cultural objects from all
parts of the globe.
II. THE NEED FOR CONTROLS
Art looters work quickly and efficiently. They have discovered-and dis-
mantled-countless archaeological sites, many of which were previously
unknown to scholars and professional archaeologists. 12 Very often, their
operations are financed by foreigners employing native diggers and even local
government officials in international schemes of art smuggling. 13 They are
known to conceal their plunder in commercial shipping crates and to trans-
port it through many countries. 14 The objects they peddle have ultimately
been acquired by some of the most respected collecting institutions in the
world. '- In fact, it is believed that most of the cultural antiquities held for
sale in the United States are stolen or illegally exported from the country of
origin. 16
Although a good deal of the illicit trafficking is in pre-Columbian artifacts,
the problem is by no means limited to Latin America. 17 Any country with a
rich cultural heritage 18 or unique ethnological art' 9 is a potential target for the
9. Bernal, supra note 1, at 119; Hamilton, Museum Acquisitions: The Case for Sef-
Regulation, in Art Law Domestic and International 347, 348 (L. DuBoff ed. 1975).
10. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977); see notes 53-99 iqfra and
accompanying text.
11. H.R. 5643, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); see pt. VI infra.
12. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
13. Id. at 28, col. 4.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1974) (pre-
Columbian stelae packed in crates at a Venezuelan fish packing plant).
15. NieE, supra note 6, at 1091.
16. Some estimates go as high as 90%. Art Law Domestic and International 289 (L. DuBoff
ed. 1975) (remarks of Prof. Merryman).
17. Nor is it a problem unique to modern times. In the early 19th century, Lord Elgin
removed sculpture from the Parthenon in Athens and shipped it to England where it is now
displayed in the British Museum as the "Elgin Marbles." L. DuBoff, supra note 6, at 65-69.
18. Italy, "the 600-mile-long art gallery," is a literal showcase of Western civilization with
many of its treasures unguarded and vulnerable to depredation. Id. at 70. Turkey has already lost
innumerable archaeological treasures. NieE, supra note 6, at 1091.
19. In 1973, newspapers throughout this country told the story of the Afo-A-Kom, a sacred
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world's art thieves. The smuggled art almost invariably travels from the
underdeveloped "art-rich" nations to economically wealthier "art-hungry"
nations, the United States, Europe, and Japan being the primary markets.20
If the situation persists, humanity may someday be haunted by "the spectre of
a world denuded of all artistic and cultural treasures in order to stock the
museums and private collections of one or a few wealthy nations."2 1
The plundered materials, especially the archaeological artifacts, have a
dual importance for humanity. In addition to being attractive pieces of art,
cultural objects also serve as documents of the past.-" Such documents,
however, cannot be read properly once they are removed from their original
site. When taken from an illegal excavation, a cultural object is usually
smuggled out of the country with every attempt made to hide its true
origins.23 Knowledge of its precise archaeological environment becomes a
mystery. The result is a beautiful, but meaningless, work of art; for the
historical significance of the work, once taken out of its context, is forever
lost. 24
The loss of a cultural object can be especially devastating to the nation
from which it was taken. Most of the victimized nations, such as those in
Central America and Africa, are underdeveloped and striving to build a
national unity. In addition to attracting valuable tourist revenues, the cultural
heritage provides these governments with a highly visible focal point around
which to build this unity. It is no surprise, then, that the destruction of the
national heritage has become an important political issue for these countries,2 5
virtually all of which have enacted legislative schemes designed to control the
loss of their cultural property. 6 Most of these laws require the issuance of
statue belonging to the people of Kom in East Cameroon. The statue, regarded by these tribal
people as embodying the very essence of their cultural identity, was stolen from its storage shed in
1966. The loss caused a perceptible deterioration in the social stability of the 40,000 inhabitants of
Kom. Several years later, the statue was discovered selling for $60,000 in the window of a
prominent New York art dealer. Following a wave of public outrage, funds were raised to
reimburse the apparently innocent dealer, and the statue was returned to Cameroon. For a
thorough discussion of the Afo-A-Kom affair, see DuBoff & Allen, The Afo-A-Kom .fair: A Plea
To Save a Cultural Heritage, in Art Law Domestic and International 425 (L. DuBoff ed. 1975).
See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1973, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times. Oct. 25, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
20. The United States is the major art-importing nation in the world. H.R. Rep. No. 615,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1977).
2 1. Merryman, The Protection of Artistic National Patrimony Against Pillaging and Theft, in
Art Law Domestic and International 236 (L. DuBoff ed. 1975).
22. Bernal, supra note 1, at 120.
23. See Council of Europe, Strasbourg, Explanatory Report on the European Convention on
the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage 6 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Explanatory Report).
24. Id.; H.R. Rep. No. 824, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972); Bernal, supra note 1, at 120; Wall
St. J., June 2, 1970, at 1, col. 1. On the other hand, the scientific loss may be equally great if
international controls result in denying scholars access to cultural property. 1977 Hearings, supra
note 8, at 70-71 (statement of Mr. Holland).
25. Bernal, supra note 1, at 119; Hamilton, supra note 9, at 348.
26. Merryman, supra note 21, at 238; see note 6 supra.
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special permits before such material may be removed from the country. 2"
Many countries, such as Mexico and Guatemala, have enacted broad national
treasury laws 28 which vest the national government with legal title in the
nation's cultural patrimony. 29 Mexico's most recent law on the subject,
enacted in 1972 after a "bitter constitutional debate," extends national own-
ership to even those cultural objects that were already privately owned. 30 The
Mexican law is but one example of these strict enactments that generally
prohibit the removal of any cultural objects from the country.
Despite these attempts at domestic governmental controls, the illicit trade
in cultural property continues to increase. 3 1 This trend stems largely from the
fact that most of the countries affected simply do not have the resources to
enforce their own controls. 32 The material to be protected is frequently
located in remote areas that are difficult to reach because of rugged terrain. 33
The guards whom these countries can afford to hire are usually underpaid
and very susceptible to bribes. 34 However, even if these countries were able
to spend large sums of money on the protection of their national treasures,
such action would probably be doomed to failure. As long as the primary
market for a nation's antiquities exists in the more developed countries where
buyers are willing to pay astronomical prices, it can be expected that these
local attempts at control will be defeated by the deeper pockets of the
wealthier art-importing nations. 3 5
III. THE TRADITIONAL REMEDIES
A. The Civil Remedy
When a cultural object is illegally removed from a foreign nation and
brought into the United States, the foreign government can seek the return of
the object by bringing a civil action in an American court. Judicial relief is
almost never sought in these cases, however, because of the many complica-
tions inherent in such a procedure. 36 The principal remedy, an action for
27. 1977 Hearings, supra note 8, at 42 (statement of Mr. Marks).
28. See United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1000 n.24 (5th Cir. 1977) (Mexico) (citing
Federal Law on Archaeological, Artistic and Historic Monuments and Zones, May 6, 1972, 312
Diario Oficial [D.O.1 16); United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1974)
(Guatemala).
29. Hamilton, supra note 9, at 348.
30. Nafziger, Controlling the Northward Flow of Mexican Antiquities, 7 Law. Am. 68, 71
(1975).
31. H.R. Rep. No. 824, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972).
32. Nafziger, Regulation by the International Council of Museums: An Example of the Role of
Non-Governmental Organizations in the Transnational Legal Process, 2 Denver J. Int'l L. & Poly
231, 232 n.6 (1972).
33. Id.
34. Id. In Guatemala, for example, a customs administrator who was ostensibly guarding
against the illicit transporting of goods was discovered to be a ringleader of a group of looters and
smugglers. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
35. Merryman, supra note 21, at 241-42.
36. "Where civil action is brought, potential problem areas read like a law school syllabus--
1180 [Vol. 46
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replevin, has proven too expensive and time consuming to be a meaningful
deterrent to the pillaging of archaeological sites. 37 To begin with, it forces the
plaintiff-government to show "not only some right of property but the right of
possession. "38
This can be particularly difficult in cases involving ancient cultural artifacts
that have been illegally excavated, for their origins are rarely adequately
documented. 39 Such objects change hands many times, generating compli-
cated chains of title. 40 Assuming the country of origin could even locate the
right defendant, it would be extremely burdensome for the country to prove
that the object came from within its borders, and virtually impossible for it to
establish the right to possess that object. To illustrate, the government of
Honduras would have to show that a claimed pre-Columbian artifact came
from inside its territory rather than from nearby Guatemala, and it would
have to prove further that the artifact came from land or collections belonging
to the Government of Honduras. The plaintiff-government would also have to
meet the applicable statute of limitations. 41 Finally, the civil remedy has the
drawback of forcing a foreign nation to place itself at the mercy of an
unfamiliar legal system, a situation which can become both frustrating and
embarrassing.
4 2
B. The Criminal Action
Where a cultural object has been stolen abroad and imported into the
United States, this country's criminal statutes will come into play.43 The most
ownership, title, conflicts of laws, proof of foreign law, comity, damages, statute of limitations or
laches, public law versus penal law, the distinction between goods, real estate and fixtures, and
so on." Rogers & Cohen, Art Pillage-International Solutions, in Art Law Domestic and
International 315, 322 (L. DuBoff ed. 1975). One noteworthy exception occurred when
Guatemala brought suit against an American art dealer, Clive Hollinshead, for the return of
certain pre-Columbian stelae. Hollinshead was, at the time, being prosecuted in the United
States for violating the National Stolen Property Act when he brought the stelae into this country.
Id. at 321; see notes 73-77 infra and accompanying text.
37. H.R. Rep. No. 824, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972).
38. Bohlen v. Arthurs, 115 U.S. 482, 485 (1885). Replevin is essentially an action to restore
rightful possession in the plaintiff. Mere ownership does not necessarily mean one is entitled to
possession. See generally 66 Am. Jur. 2d Replevin (1973). The wrongful possessor need not know
the object was stolen for the owner to replevy that object in most states. See, e.g., Bozeman
Mortuary Ass'n v. Fairchild, 260 Ky. 748, 86 S.W.2d 979 (1935); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§
7101-7111 (McKinney 1963 & Cum. Supp. 1964-1977).
39. Bernal, supra note 1, at 120; Explanatory Report, supra note 23, at 6.
40. Smuggled artifacts typically pass through numerous countries. 1977 Hearings, supra note
8, at 19 (statement of Joseph Duffey as presented by Mr. Mauer). Two of the most common
entrepots are Switzerland and Lebanon. Nafziger, supra note 32, at 232-33 n.6.
41. In New York, the action must be brought within three years from the time of the taking.
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 214 (McKinney 1972). If the cause of action accrued outside the state, the
limitation periods of both states must be considered. Id. § 202. Federal diversity actions would be
subject to state periods of limitation. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)
42. Rogers & Cohen, supra note 36, at 302; Nafziger, supra note 30, at 73.
43. Comment, Legal Approaches to the Trade in Stolen Antiquities, 2 Syracuse J. Int'l L. &
Com. 51, 59 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Legal Approaches].
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important statute in this area is the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA),44
which makes it a crime to transport "in interstate or foreign commerce any
goods . . . of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been
stolen, converted or taken by fraud .... ",45 The statute further prohibits the
receipt or sale of such goods if they "are a part of, or . . . constitute interstate
or foreign commerce .... -46 The fact that many cultural objects have a
value below $5,000 at the situs of their discovery does not bar application of
the NSPA because, under this statute, the value of the property can be
determined by its market value at any time during receipt and concealment.
47
Where the NSPA does not apply, state stolen property statutes may come into
play, since such statutes generally can be invoked for possession of stolen
property having little or no value whatsoever. 4
8
The effectiveness of the criminal prosecution in cultural property cases is
diminished because an essential element in any prosecution for the crime of
receiving stolen goods is knowledge on the part of the accused that the
property is stolen, or knowledge that would put him on inquiry as to its stolen
character. 4 9 When a person buys a cultural object in this country, he is rarely
able to obtain accurate information on the provenance of that object. Most
purchasers, even professional art dealers, are simply incapable of learning
how a particular object was removed from its country of origin. 50 Conse-
quently, the scienter requirement is a great obstacle to the application of
stolen property laws to cases involving foreign cultural property.
5 1
With all the problems inherent in both the civil and criminal actions, it is
not surprising that the recovery of important cultural property has more often
44. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1976).
45. Id. Violators are to be "fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both." Id. § 2314.
46. Id. § 2315.
47. The defendant in United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961), for example, was
convicted at trial of receiving blank money orders onto which he had subsequently forged the face
value. While the Second Circuit reversed the conviction on evidentiary grounds, it held that the
NSPA was nevertheless applicable, for "[iut is not essential that the stolen property be worth [the
statutory amount] at the moment of receipt." Id. at 921.
48. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-67 (1972); N.Y. Penal Law § 165.40 (McKinney 1975).
In New York, if the defendant "is in the business of buying, selling or otherwise dealing in
property," he will be subject to criminal possession in at least the second degree. N.Y. Penal Law
§ 165.45 (McKinney 1975) (maximum four years imprisonment, id. § 70.00, and possible fine, id.
§ 80.00). This is especially relevant in cultural property cases since such property is usually
imported by professional art dealers.
49. United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1112 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911
(1970) (applying NSPA); United States v. Sutton, 245 F. Supp. 357 (D. Md. 1965), aff'd, 363 F.2d
845 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1014 (1967) 'applying Maryland law). The circum-
stances necessary to put an accused on inquiry must be clear and unequivocal. Direct Sales Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943).
50. One illustration of this is the Afo-A-Kom incident. See note 19 supra.
5 1. Legal Approaches, supra note 43, at 59; Note, The Legal Response to the Illicit Movement
of Cultural Property, 5 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 932, 956 (1973) [hereinafter cited asLegal Responsel.
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FOREIGN CULTURAL PROPERTY
come about through private negotiations than judicial relief,5 2 a process
which can have very little deterrent effect on the illicit trade. This state of
affairs, however, may be significantly changed by the recent case of United
States v. McClain.
5 3
McClain involved five defendants who were convicted of conspiring to
transport, receive, and sell stolen pre-Columbian artifacts in interstate and
foreign commerce in violation of the NSPA. The prosecution charged that the
artifacts involved were the property of Mexico by reason of that government's
declaration of ownership over all pre-Columbian artifacts within its borders.
The Mexican Government's ownership was asserted by the prosecution "de-
spite the probability or possibility that the defendants, or their vendors,
acquired [the objects] from private individuals or 'found' them . . . on
private property in Mexico."'5 4 The defendants contended that the Mexican
Government's declaration of ownership was "not enough to bring the objects
within the protection of the NSPA." s s
The evidence showed that one of the defendants had attempted to sell
certain pre-Columbian artifacts to the director of the Mexican Cultural
Institute in San Antonio, Texas, an organization which turned out to be an
official arm of the Mexican Government. In addition, the other defendants had
offered to sell some of the artifacts to an undercover FBI agent. Though it
was conceded that the material had been illegally exported from Mexico, there
was no evidence as to how or when such exportation occurred. The defen-
dants were convicted on the basis of testimony by a deputy attorney general of
Mexico that ownership of these objects had been vested in the Mexican
Government since 1897.56
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the convictions upon a finding
that, contrary to the expert testimony at trial, government ownership of all
pre-Columbian artifacts in Mexico did not come about until 1972., 7 It was in
that year that the Mexican legislature enacted a law which stated that
" '[a]rchaeological monuments, movables and immovables, are the inalienable
and imprescriptible property of the Nation.' "58 The declaration included any
objects, even those in private collections, that are the " 'product of the
cultures prior to the establishment of the Spanish culture in the National
Territory.' "-59 Clearly, the material in the McClain case was within the
category established by the new law. Since, however, there was no evidence
of when the material was removed from Mexico, the Fifth Circuit found that
the jury had no basis for determining that removal occurred at a time when
the law was in effect.
52. Legal Approaches, supra note 43, at 60.
53. 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977).
54. Id. at 993.
55. Id. at 994.
56. Id. at 993.
57. Id. at 992.
58. Federal Law on Archaeological, Artistic and Historic Monuments and Zones, May 6,
1972, 312 D.O. 16, quoted in United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1000 (5th Cir. 1977).
59. 545 F.2d at 1000.
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In its decision, the Fifth Circuit pointed out the distinction between a
government's power to regulate and actual ownership, and reaffirmed the
principle that illegal exportation does not render an object "stolen" within any
meaning of the word.60 That is, while a government may have the inherent
power to regulate the movement of articles through and within its borders,
such power does not vest ownership of those articles in the government. The
court made it clear, however, that a government can acquire actual own-
ership of property simply by declaring its ownership of that property. 6 1 In so
doing, a government need not ever possess the objects; 62 in fact, it does not
even have to know they exist. 63 Once such a declaration is made, a subse-
quent unauthorized exportation of that property will be "a sufficient act of
conversion to be deemed a theft."'64 Thus, according to McClain, anyone
possessing property in this country and knowing it was removed from a
nation that has declared itself the owner of that property will be subject to
criminal prosecution in the United States.
The McClain court recognized the validity of the Mexican declaration of
ownership as being "an attribute of sovereignty. '6 5 This deference to foreign
sovereignty grows out of the American act of state doctrine, which states
that "[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.
6 6
More specifically, the United States Supreme Court has held that this princi-
ple is "applicable to a case involving the title to property brought within the
custody of a court."' 67 In fact, in 1972, the Senate Report on the UNESCO
Convention indicated that this country would recognize the validity of a
foreign nation's decree of ownership over "certain cultural property" within its
jurisdiction, and that "[i]llegal removal of such property . . . should be
recognized as theft.16 8
The great impact which the McClain case may have upon professionals in
the art field was acknowledged by the court in the very first sentence of its
opinion: "Museum directors, art dealers, and innumerable private collectors
throughout this country must have been in a state of shock when they read
the news-if they did-of the convictions of the five defendants in this
60. Id. at 1002.
61. Id. at 1002-03.
62. "[Plossession is but a frequent incident, not the sine qua non of ownership, in the common
law or the civil law." Id. at 992.
63. Under present Mexican law, cultural artifacts belong to the state "even when they are
,unknown' or lost." Nafziger, supra note 30, at 70.
64. 545 F.2d at 1003 n.33.
65. Id. at 1003.
66. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
67. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918).
68. Senate Report on UNESCO Convention, S. Exec. Rep. No. 92-29, reprinted in Art
Works: Law, Policy, Practice 536, 541 (F. Feldman & S. Weil eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
1972 Senate Report].
[Vol. 461184
FOREIGN CULTURAL PROPERTY
case." 69 Officials of established and respected museums, who generally have
come to support control over the illicit traffic in antiquities," ° have neverthe-
less expressed concern over the ramifications of McClain.7 1 It is feared that
such a use of the NSPA could place museum trustees and other collectors in
jeopardy of conviction as a result of foreign statutes that are often overbroad
and rarely available in English translations. 72
McClain was not the first case to look to foreign national treasury laws in a
United States stolen property prosecution. In 1974, in United States v. Hollins-
head,"3 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction of Clive Hollinshead, an
American art dealer who imported into this country a pre-Columbian artifact
that had been declared the public property of the government of Guatemala.
The Hollinshead case was unusual, however, in that the stolen object was so
well known that the defendant must have been aware of its origin.7 4 Fur-
thermore, the involvement of Hollinshead and his codefendant in the illegal
transport of the property was so clear that "[i]t would have been astonishing if
the jury had found that they did not know the stele was stolen. "7s Accord-
ingly, the question of Hollinshead's knowledge of a Guatemalan declaration of
ownership was of minimal importance to the establishment of scienter in the
case.
The Hollinshead jury was instructed that every person is presumed to
know what the law forbids.7 6 On appeal, it was contended that no such
presumption exists with respect to foreign law. The Ninth Circuit sustained
the contention, but held the error not prejudicial in the context of the entire
jury charge, which had made it clear that conviction required proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendants knew the objects were stolen.7 7
The crime of receiving stolen goods requires that the guilty person possess
the goods with knowledge that they were stolen.7 8 The word "stolen," how-
69. 545 F.2d at 991.
70. See note 125 infra and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., 1977 Hearings, supra note 8, at 2 (statement of Douglas Dillon, President,
Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York).
72. Id. at 3. The court of appeals in McClain had to rely on English translations of Mexican
law (i.e., in addition to the testimony of the Government's expert witness) prepared by amid
curiae who themselves were unable to procure translations even from such sources as the Library
of Congress, the Mexican Embassy, and the Organization of American States. 545 F.2d at 997
n. 15. The court did not consider whether criminal sanctions should be imposed where it appears
that the accused could not with reasonable effort determine what the law requires of him. See
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Rowan v. United States Post Office
Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
73. 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
74. Nafziger, supra note 30, at 72.
75. 495 F.2d at 1155-56.
76. Id. at 1155.
77. Id. at 1156.
78. United States v. Zarattini, 552 F.2d 753, 760 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 942
(1977); Corey v. United States, 305 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 956 (1963);
United States v. Sutton, 245 F. Supp. 357 (D. Md. 1965), affld, 363 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1014 (1967).
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ever, has no common law meaning, and has been subject to very broad
definitions in criminal cases.79 In the context of stolen property statutes, such
as the NSPA and the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act,80 the word "stealing"
has generally been interpreted to mean all felonious takings with an intent to
deprive another of his property. 81 Accordingly. it is essential for the accused
to know that the goods were owned by someone at the time of the taking.
In Morissette v. United States,8 2 the defendant was convicted of stealing
United States government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641.83 The
property involved was a quantity of spent bomb casings which Morissette
found on an Air Force bombing range. Morissette openly carried away the
casings, thinking that they had been abandoned by the government. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction because, in taking the
property, Morissette did not intend to deprive anyone of the rights of own-
ership with respect to that property. The Court stated that "it is not apparent
how Morissette could have knowingly or intentionally converted property that
he did not know could be converted. 8 4
In McClain, while the defendants knew that the material was illegally
exported, there was no suggestion that they knew the objects had been
declared by Mexico to be the property of the state.8 5 Thus, while the defen-
dants clearly knew of the taking of the objects, it was not clear that they
knew such original taking was with the intent to wrongfully deprive anyone
of the ownership of those objects. Nevertheless, the court stated that the mere
existence of the legislative declaration combined with the unauthorized expor-
tation was sufficient to bring the NSPA into play.8 6 It was indicated that the
convictions in this case would have been affirmed had the Mexican decree
been in existence when the artifacts were exported.8 7 Consequently, it appears
that a theft occurs when an object is removed from a country at a time when
it is owned by the state, regardless of whether or not the defendant knew it
was so owned. Thus, it would seem that a person attempting to bring an
illegally exported object into this country would either be free to do so88 or be
79. See, e.g., United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1957); Lyda v. United States, 279 F.2d
461 (5th Cir. 1960); Crabb v. Zerbst, 99 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1938).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1976).
81. United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 417 (1957); United States v. Anderson, 532 F.2d
1218, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976).
82. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
83. The statute provides that "[wihoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts
[a] thing of value of the United States" is subject to fine and imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 641
(1976).
84. 342 U.S. at 271.
85. At trial, the sole evidence as to ownership of the material was the erroneous testimony of
the Government's expert on Mexican law, L. DuBoff, The Deskbook of Art Law 83 (1977); see
United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 993 (5th Cir. 1977), and the court of appeals did not
suggest that there was any indication the defendants knew the material was stolen.
86. Id. at 1000-01.
87. Id. at 1003.
88. See note 114 infra and accompanying text.
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guilty of a federal crime, depending entirely on whether the country of origin
had declared ownership of that object. Even though the actus reus and mens
rea of such a person might be exactly the same in either situation, the
McClain reasoning would require drastically different results.
While it is generally true that ignorance of the law is no defense,8 9 the
McClain case involved more than just ignorance of the law. Receiving stolen
goods, like the crime of larceny, requires the accused to know that the
property rights of another are being violated. 90 In cases involving cultural
property owned by a foreign government only by reason of a legislative
decree, the sole way in which the accused could know that property rights
were involved would be through realization of that decree. Accordingly, one
may wonder why the McClain court placed so much emphasis on the date of
the Mexican declaration while entirely ignoring the question of whether the
defendants actually knew of any such declaration.
The court in McClain noted that the NSPA has been applied to foreign
thefts before, 91 and cited two examples in addition to Hollinshead.92 In the
first example, United States v. Rabin,93 the court stated that v[w]herever the
right to possess property is recognized the taking and carrying away of the
property of another without his consent and with intent to deprive him of it is
stealing."'94 Stealing was thus recognized in Rabin as an offense against
possession.95 Yet, McClain would invoke the NSPA regardless of whether a
person carrying away property knew it was wrongfully taken from the posses-
sion of another. For example, a citizen of Mexico who moves to the United
States taking his private collection of pre-Columbian artifacts with him could
be prosecuted under the McClain interpretation of the NSPA. 96 Similarly, an
American citizen who purchases such artifacts in Mexico without any knowl-
edge of that country's ownership of all pre-Columbian materials could be
criminally liable when he brings the items home with him to this country.
In the second case, United States v. Greco, 97 the Second Circuit explicitly
stated that it was not "concerned with the unlikely case where the goods...
89. Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Mlinnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1909); United States v. Toomey,
404 F. Supp. 1377, 1380 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
90. J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 392-93 (2d ed. 1960); see notes 82-84 supra
and accompanying text.
91. 545 F.2d at 994.
92. 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974); see notes 73-77 supra and accompanying text.
93. 316 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 815 (1963).
94. Id. at 566. The court held that certain bearer bonds, which had been forcibly removed
from a Canadian bank vault, could be characterized as stolen even without proof of a Canadian
law proscribing such removal.
95. See Levin v. United States, 338 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 999
(1965); Davenport v. State, 53 Ala. App. 326, 299 So. 2d 767, cert. denied, 293 Ala. 751, 299 So.
2d 771 (1974).
96. The court hinted, however, that this extreme situation would be so contrary to "American
notions of fundamental fairness" that a due process defense could possibly prevail here. 545 .2d
at 996 n.12.
97. 298 F.2d 247 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 820 (1962).
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might be 'stolen' according to the laws of one of the two countries and yet not
be 'stolen' according to the laws of the other country." 98 Although the NSPA
has indeed been applied to goods stolen in other countries, the application of
the statute to nationally owned cultural material is only a recent develop-
ment.99
IV. NONGOVERNMENTAL RESTRICTIONS
While special governmental controls on the importation of cultural property
have been slow to develop in this country, regulation has been steadily
developing among museums themselves in recent years. This has come about
primarily through the activities of various national and international museum
associations which have promulgated ethical codes designed to guide the
acquisition policies of member institutions.
The most important of these nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is the
International Council of Museums (ICOM), which was established in 1946
and now represents approximately 3,000 institutions in over 100 countries. 1 00
In 1970, ICOM reported the enactment of its ethical rules for museums. 101
Three years later, representatives from six of the major American organiza-
tions issued the Joint Statement in Support of ICOM Ethics of Acquisition. 102
This document recognized that "[m]useums have in the past either engaged in,
or tolerated on the part of others, activities often detrimental to the integrity
of their mission,"' 0 3 and further stated that the participating organizations
will "cooperate fully with foreign countries . . . to preserve cultural property
• . . and to prevent illicit traffic in such cultural property. °10 4 The statement
expressed the belief that such cooperation is best implemented by "refusing to
acquire" cultural property exported illegally, 105 and advocated the implemen-
tation of controls which curtail the illicit traffic but which encourage legiti-
mate exchange.
Although the proclamations of the NGOs could never be as effective as
congressional legislation, they can serve as an important deterrent to the
98. Id. at 251.
99. Even though the NSPA has been in effect since 1934, Hollinshead was the first American
dealer to be convicted in the United States for trafficking in stolen antiquities from another
country. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1973, at 28, col. 5.
100. Nafziger, supra note 32, at 244.
101. Report of the Special Committee of Governmental Experts To Examine the Draft
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property, 9 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1038, 1039 (1970).
102. Reprinted in Art Works: Law, Policy, Practice 642 (F. Feldman & S. Weil eds. 1974). In
attendance were the American Association of Museums, the United States Committee of ICOM,
the College Art Association of America, the Association of Art Museum Directors, the Ar-
chaeological Institute of America, and the American Anthropological Association Society for
American Archaeology.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. It should be noted that this resolution does not affirmatively state that participating
organizations will refrain from acquiring such property.
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acquisition of illicit cultural property by the world's museums and other
large-volume collectors. NGOs perform an important role as pressure groups
that can shape public opinion and "mobilize shame" within the profession. 0 6
Furthermore, an institution's accreditation can depend upon its adherence to
the guidelines. Loss of accreditation could mean the loss of endowments and
even tax exemptions.
10 7
In addition to the activities of NGOs, institutions throughout the country
are adopting their own policies dealing with illegally exported art. 0 8 But even
if most of the important museums refrained from acquiring suspect property,
the major market for illicit art would remain largely unaffected. The fact
remains that museum acquisitions are usually not purchased outright by the
museum. Most art coming into this country for sale is acquired by private
dealers and collectors; it is the gifts of these private individuals that make
most of the public collections in this country possible. 10 9 Accordingly, effec-
tive regulation of cultural acquisitions in this country will require measures
directed at the activities of private collectors, rather than just public institu-
tions.
V. A REVIEW OF UNITED STATES POLICIES
A. The Free Trade Position
The fact that much of the illicit cultural material ultimately comes to rest in
the United States n ° was, until recent years, largely ignored by the American
government."' Traditionally, the flow of art into this country has actually
been encouraged by duty-free entry for cultural material 1"2 and tax deduc-
tions for gifts of art to certain institutions." 3 The possibility that many of the
art works being imported were exported illegally from another nation was of
no consequence in this country. To this day, as a general rule, possession of
an illegally exported object cannot be challenged in this country merely
because of its illegal exportation. 14
It was not until the early 1970s that the United States began to show a
106. Nafziger, supra note 32, at 243, 249.
107. Hamilton, supra note 9, at 352.
108. See, e.g., The Field Museum of Natural History: Policy Statement Concerning Acquisi-
tion of Antiquities, reprinted in Art Works: Law, Policy, Practice 627 (F. Feldman & S. Weil eds.
1974). "The Museum will not acquire any archaeological or ethnographic object that cannot be
shown to the satisfaction of the Museum official or committee responsible for its acquisition to
have been exported legally from its country of origin." Id. at 628.
109. 1977 Hearings, supra note 8, at 40 (statement of Mr. Emmerich).
110. See 1972 Senate Report, supra note 68, at 543.
111. Legal Response, supra note 51, at 956.
112. 19 U.S.C. § 1202, pt. 11 (1970).
113. I.R.C. § 170.
114. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 996 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoting Bator, Interna-
tional Trade in National Art Treasures: Regulation and Deregulation, in Art Law Domestic and
International 295, 300 (L. DuBoff ed. 1975)). The court pointed out that if -an object were
considered 'stolen' merely because it was illegally exported, the meaning of the term 'stolen'
would be stretched beyond its conventional meaning." Id. at 1002.
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serious interest in controlling the importation of illicitly acquired cultural
material. By this time the trade had come to be recognized as a widespread
and well-organized business.' 15 It also had become apparent that the illicit
trade was an important issue to many foreign governments, 116 and that
continued United States indifference could have undesirable consequences
with respect to this country's foreign relations. Despite these realizations,
congressional action has been slowed by some persistent arguments against
legislative restrictions on the movement of art.
The most common argument against restrictions is based on the "black
market theory." As the art-exporting nations have tightened their controls on
art acquisition, the prices for their cultural objects have risen dramatically,
making this property more attractive to investors and therefore all the more
sought-after by looters." 7 Many countries nevertheless continue on a path of
legislative overkill. Mexican law, for instance, does not allow duplicates or
even the most insignificant artifacts to be exported from the country. 11
Museum storerooms in Mexico are overstuffed with pieces because of the
shortage of display rooms.' 19 Meanwhile, the material most in need of protec-
tion, that which is still in the countryside, is placed in greater jeopardy than
ever before.120 It is feared that additional restrictions in the form of United
States legislation will only further aggravate the situation.' 21
Another reason for United States inaction is the belief that Americans will
be making a noble but very pointless sacrifice by curtailing the flow of art into
this country. Most of the older cities in this country, particularly in the
Northeast, already have outstanding museums that have been building their
collections for decades.' 22 A large part of the United States, however, has not
been so fortunate, and only recently have many areas of the country experi-
enced the cultural growth that was once exclusive to the older cities. The
states in the Sun Belt, for instance, are developing economic and political
power faster than any other part of the country, and the demand for cultural
attractions in this region has risen accordingly. 123 Legislators from these states
are reluctant to support legislation that would deny their constituents the
same cultural opportunities those in other parts of the country have been
115. See H.R. Rep. No. 824, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1972); Wall St. J., June 2, 1972, at 1,
col. 1.
116. See notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
117. See 1972 Senate Report, supra note 68, at 543; Legal Approaches, supra note 43, at
65-66.
118. "At least on paper, Mexico has taken a giant step backward, reentrenching regulatory
methods which have long been discredited." Rogers & Cohen, supra note 36, at 322.
119. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1973, at 28, col. 3.
120. After Mexico enacted its most recent and most stringent national treasury law, there
were more Mexican antiquities being offered for sale in New York than ever before. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 27, 1973, at 28, col. 1.
121. One estimate is that illegal excavations would increase by 30-50%. 1977 Hearings, sispra
note 8, at 45 (statement of Mr. Merrin).
122. Id. at 39 (statement of Mr. Emmerich).
123. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1976, at 24, col. 2.
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enjoying for generations.12 4 While most of the more established museums
have come out in favor of import restrictions,12 5 nearly all of the museums on
record as opposing proposed controls are from the less culturally developed
areas of the country. 126 It has been further argued that while millions of
Americans will be denied access to the cultural material, the illicit trade will
only be diverted to the other art-importing nations such as Japan, Switzer-
land, France, and West Germany, which do not have any policy of restricting
such imports. 12 7
B. The UNESCO Convention
The first global agreement against the international trade in illicit cultural
materials1 2 8 came aboutin 1970 when the United Nations Educational Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted its convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the llicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property. 12 9 The United States played a key role in the formulation of
this convention, 130 particularly in the rejection of a proposed Preliminary
Draft13 1 which would have prohibited signatory nations from importing any
cultural item not exported with the approval of its country of origin. 132 Under the
Preliminary Draft, a country could exclude the rest of the world from acquiring
its art simply by refusing to issue special certificates which would be necessary'to
124. See, e.g., 1977 Hearings, supra note 8, at 22 (statement of Congressman Gibbons of
Florida).
125. Id. at 70 (statement of Prof. Coe); see note 108 supra and accompanying text.
126. Among those expressing opposition to proposed import restrictions are the North
Carolina Museum of Art, id. at 121, the Seattle Art Museum, id. at 132, and the Hunter Museum
of Art (Tennessee), id. at 108.
127. Id. at 31 (statement of Mr. Ewing). The only nations to sign the UNESCO Convention,
see notes 128-40 infra and accompanying text, thus far are Third World art-exporting nations, id.
at 38 (statement of Mr. Emmerich as presented by Mr. Ewing). It is the position of the United
States Department of State that other art-importing countries are awaiting United States action
before implementing controls of their own. Id. at 18 (statement of Hon. Joseph Duffey as
presented by Mr. Maurer).
128. Prior to 1970, international agreements for the protection of cultural property existed in
the form of treaties dealing with the status of art works in the event of military conflict. See, e.g.,
The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, done May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215.
129. 10 Int'l Leg. Mat. 289 (1971) [hereinafter cited as UNESCO Convention). In 1969, the
Council of Europe adopted a regional model of the UNESCO Convention. European Convention
on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, 8 Int'l Leg. Mat. 736 (1969). See generally
Explanatory Report, supra note 23.
130. The Convention is the result of a decade of negotiations. Legal Approaches, supra note
43, at 56.
131. Preliminary Draft Concerning the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing Illegal Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, UNESCO doc. SHC/MD!3 annex, cited
in Art Law, Domestic and International 317 n.5 (L. DuBoff ed. 1975).
132. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 996-97 n.14 (5th Cir. 1977); Bator, Regulation
and Deregulation of International Trade, in Art Law Domestic and International 299, 301 (L.
DuBoff ed. 1975); Legal Response, supra note 51, at 951.
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prove lawful exportation. The United States strongly opposed this draft on the
ground that it was contrary to the interests of legitimate cultural exchange. 133
The American Society for International Law then organized a panel of experts
which submitted an alternate draft on behalf of the United States.' 34 The
UNESCO Convention in its final form represents a compromise between the
severe Preliminary Draft and the alternative draft by the United States.
The Convention deals exclusively with material "specifically designated by
each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature,
art or science" and which comes within certain categories set forth in the
agreement. 1 35 State Parties are to set up "national services" for the protection of
their cultural heritage "as appropriate for each country,"' 3 6 and must issue
special certificates before cultural property may legally be removed from their
borders. 137 There is, however, no general provision against the importation of
cultural property which is not accompanied by such a certificate." 38 At the
suggestion of the United States, a crisis provision was included which provides
that when a nation's cultural patrimony is in jeopardy of destruction, that nation
shall "call upon" other State Parties "to participate in a concerted international
effort" for the protection of that patrimony. 139 This provision contemplates the
future implementation of bilateral and multilateral agreements as they are
needed, with import and export controls specifically mentioned as tools to be
utilized. 14
0
In August 1972, the United States Senate voted 79-0 to give its advice and
consent to the UNESCO Convention.14 ' The approval, however, was made
subject to the understanding that the United States is not obligated to impose
restrictions on the importation of cultural objects,142 and that the Convention
will not affect existing remedies in state or federal courts. 143 Additionally, the
Senate provided that the terms of the Convention are not self-executing.1
44
133. Rogers & Cohen, supra note 36, at 317-18. It is widely recognized that nations which
require export certificates rarely grant them. 1977 Hearings, supra note 8, at 32 (statement of Mr.
Ewing), 42 (statement of Mr. Marks). Mexico has required export certificates since 1934. Since
then only between 50 and 70 have been issued. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 993 (5th
Cir. 1977).
134. Rogers & Cohen, supra note 36, at 318.
135. UNESCO Convention, supra note 129, art. 1.
136. Id. art. 5. This language allows State Parties to avoid entirely the establishment of
such services with all the accompanying expenses.
137. Id. art. 6(a).
138. The only importation prohibition contained in the Convention applies to property stolen
from a museum or monument of a State Party. Id. art 7(b)(i). Such property must be returned to
the State Party on demand, but only if the requesting state pays "just compensation" to innocent
purchasers or persons having a valid title. Id. art. 7(b)(ii).
139. Id. art. 9.
140. Id.
141. 118 Cong. Rec. 27, 924-25 (Aug. 11, 1972).
142. 1972 Senate Report, supra note 68, at 538.
143. The report specifies that innocent purchasers need not be compensated where this is
contrary to United States law. Id. at 539.
144. It should be noted that advice and consent does not, in and of itself, operate to make the
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These conditions, and other understandings expressed by the Senate, 145 sug-
gest the basic character of the UNESCO Convention. Standing by itself, the
Convention represents very little in the nature of affirmative control. Rather,
it serves as a starting point for international cooperation in protecting the
world's cultural heritage. It is essentially a framework within which nations
might be expected to fashion more effective measures suited to their specific
needs.
C. The Mexico Treaty
While the UNESCO Convention was reaching the final stages of negotia-
tions, the United States concluded a bilateral agreement with Mexico' 46 in an
effort to alleviate the growing problem of illicit traffic in pre-Columbian
properties between the two nations. 4 7 The primary objective of the Mexico
Treaty is to deter illicit excavations and at the same time encourage the
legitimate discovery and exchange of archeological and historical materials. 148
Upon the request of one of the parties, the other party is to "employ the legal
means at its disposal to recover and return from its territory stolen" cultural
property that was removed from the territory of the requesting party after the
effective date of the treaty.149 No action is required until the requesting party
has furnished documented evidence establishing its claim to the property. 150
The attorney general of the requested party is authorized to institute civil
proceedings in the appropriate district court' s ' in cases where the return of
treaty binding upon the United States. Advice and consent is primarily a function of consultation
and approval and is not equivalent to ratification. See K. Holloway, Modern Trends in Treaty
Law 53-54 (1967). This is particularly important when the treaty is not self-executing. "Our
constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land," but when the treaty is not self-executing,
"the legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the Court." Foster v.
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
145. Altogether, there were seven reservations and understandings. Other than those set forth
in the text, the Senate expressed the following: (a) only those museums whose acquisitions are
presently under national control shall be subject to governmental restrictions, (b) the United
States need not establish any additional national services for the protection of the national
patrimony, (c) theft and the receipt of stolen cultural objects are already prohibited by "the laws
of the United States, and presumably the laws of most states," (d) regulation of antique dealers is
not obligatory. 1972 Senate Report, supra note 68, at 538-41.
146. Treaty of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural
Properties, July 17, 1970, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7088 [hereinafter cited as Mexico
Treaty].
147. Senate Report on United States-Mexico Treaty, reprinted in Art Works: Law, Policy,
Practice 559 (F. Feldman & S. Weil eds. 1974).
148. Mexico Treaty, supra note 146, at art. II. The treaty is intended to avoid the excesses of
the over-broad national treasury laws, see, e.g., notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text, by
reason of an express limitation that it shall only apply to material of "outstanding importance,"
Mexico Treaty art. I.
149. Mexico Treaty, supra note 146, art. II(1).
150. Id. art. rl11(2).
151. The federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1970). This provision is,
therefore, self-executing.
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the property cannot be otherwise effected.152
The Mexico Treaty serves as an important indicator of the willingness of
the United States to cooperate with other nations in their efforts to save their
national patrimony. It obligates the federal government to aid in the recovery
of this property, whereas previously the Mexican government was left to
operate on its own through unfamiliar courts or, as was more often the case,
to attempt recovery through private negotiations.' 3 The treaty did not,
however, attempt to deal with the complications inherent in the traditional
legal remedies in this area. 154 In fact, its effectiveness was severely restricted
by limiting application of the treaty to "stolen" cultural property. Is
When the United States ratified the Mexico Treaty, it was with the clear
understanding that both nations would benefit by its operation. 156 Shortly
after this ratification, Mexico enacted its current national treasury law prohib-
iting all export of cultural material from that country.' 5 7 This development
critically undermined the treaty's objective of legitimate exchange, and raises
at least a suggestion of bad faith as to Mexico's performance under the
treaty.' 5 8 On the other hand, the treaty has had only limited application since
coming into force'5 9 and should not seriously be expected to influence Mexi-
can art policies.
D. The Pre-Columbian Act
The shortcomings of the Mexico Treaty became painfully apparent in the
years following its ratification as the illicit trade in Mexican and other pre-
Columbian antiquities continued to rise. 160 Consequently, in 1972 the United
States acted again to alleviate the effects of a "flourishing international mar-
ket" for this material.' 6' This time the action came in the form of a Depart-
ment of State proposal for unilateral controls, 62 a proposal which received
the support of this country's major collecting institutions and dealers. 163
The Pre-Columbian Act' 64 applies to any stone carving, the product of a
152. Mexico Treaty, supra note 146, art. 111(3).
153. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
154. See notes 36-52 supra and accompanying text.
155. See notes 78-84 supra and accompanying text.
156. 117 Cong. Rec. 2520, 2521 (Feb. 10, 1971) (statement of Senator Mansfield). Treaties
should always benefit this country by securing foreign governmental action "in a way deemed
advantageous to the United States." Dep't of State Circular No. 175, 50 Am. J. Int'l L. 784, 785
(1956).
157. See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
158. Signatories to a treaty have a legal obligation to perform in good faith the spirit as well
as the letter of the treaty without evasion or subterfuge. Draft Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 981 (Supp. 1935). See also Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties,
[1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 177, 181.
159. Nafziger, supra note 30, at 74.
160. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1973, at 28, col. 1.
161. H.R. Rep. No. 824, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972).
162. Id. at 2.
163. Id. at 3.
164. Regulation of Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architectural Sculpture or
Murals (Pre-Columbian Act), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (Supp. III 1973).
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pre-Columbian Indian culture, which existed as a monument or architectural
structure or part thereof. 65 Under its provisions, the Secretary of the Trea-
sury, after consulting with the Secretary of State, is to promulgate a list of the
specific types of material to be protected. 166 Any item on this list may not be
imported into this country unless it is accompanied by a certificate issued by
the country of origin certifying that the object was not exported in violation of
the laws of that country.16
7
If an object requires but is not accompanied by an export certificate, 168 it
will be forfeited to the United States and returned to the country of origin. 169
Generally, the importer of the property will not be compensated for his loss.
He may, however, petition the Secretary of the Treasury for a remission or
mitigation of the forfeiture under the Tariff Act of 1930.170
The Pre-Columbian Act has an enormous advantage over the Mexico
Treaty in that it is designed to prevent the illicit material from entering this
country in the first instance rather than attempting to facilitate the recovery of
items after they have already been acquired by United States residents. While
the treaty has had only limited application since its ratification, the Pre-
Columbian Act has proven highly effective in controlling the flow of illicit
material into the United States. 17' This success has largely been due to
energetic enforcement efforts of the United States Customs Service, which has
been applying the import restrictions even to the smaller non-monumental
objects that do not come under the Act.17 2
VI. THE NEW LEGISLATION
A. General Approach
When the United States Senate gave its advice and consent to the U-
NESCO Convention, it was with the explicit understanding that the provisions
of the Convention were not self-executing. 73 Since that time, there have been
three attempts to enact implementing legislation in the United States Con-
gress. The first two of these died in committee. 174 The third,17 5 however, has
165. Id. § 2095(3).
166. Id. § 2091.
167. Id. § 2092(a). Importation will also be allowed if the consignee presents adequate
evidence that the item was exported from the country of origin on or before the effective date of
the law, or evidence that the item is not in fact covered by the Secretary's list. Id. § 2092(b).
168. The consignee has 90 days in which to comply with the requirements. Id. § 2092(b)(3).
169. Id. § 2093. However, if the country of origin does not agree to pay the cost of returning
the object, it will be disposed of according to the United States customs laws. Id.
170. 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1970). The mitigation can be granted in instances where the Secretary
finds that "forfeiture was incurred without willful negligence or without any intention on the part
of the petitioner to defraud the revenue or to violate the law, or finds the existence of such
mitigating circumstances as to justify [such relief] . Id.
171. Nafziger, supra note 30, at 72-73.
172. Id.
173. See note 144 supra.
174. H.R. 14171, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), 122 Cong. Rec. H5304 (daily ed. June 3, 1976)
(reported to the Committee on Ways and Means); H.R. 11754, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), 119
Cong. Rec. 39,279 (Dec. 3, 1973) (reported to Committee on Ways and Means).
175. H.R. 5643, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Implementing Bill].
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recently passed the House and is presently awaiting action in the Senate.17 6
The current legislation is similar to the Pre-Columbian Act in its use of
import restrictions as a means to curb the domestic market for illicit foreign
cultural property. It is considerably more sophisticated, however, since it is
intended to deal with cultural material coming from all over the world rather
than just that which emanates from Latin American countries.
The bill provides a three-pronged attack against the illicit trade. The first
prong authorizes the President to enter into bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments-with other countries pursuant to article nine of the UNESCO Conven-
tion.' 77 Secondly, the President is empowered to apply unilateral restrictions
to meet "emergency conditions" with respect to the cultural patrimony of a
party to the Convention (State Party).1 78 Finally, the bill imposes a total ban
on the importation of any article of cultural property that has been stolen
from a museum or other public monument of a State Party after the effective
date of the Act. 179
B. Presidential Action
Before the President may enter into a multilateral or bilateral agreement' 0
under the Act, he must first be requested to do so by a party to the UNESCO
Convention.' 8 1 In addition, the bill sets forth a number of conditions which
must exist before any import restrictions may be implemented pursuant to
such an agreement. The first of these requires that the cultural patrimony of
the State Party must indeed be in jeopardy of pillage. 18 2 This does not mean,
however, that the situation must be of extraordinary proportions before this
country can respond. 183 Rather, it will help to ensure that the President will
not agree to restrictions merely to please a requesting government.
The second condition to the application of import restrictions under this
part of the bill requires the State Party to already be taking measures of its
own to protect its cultural patrimony. 184 The mere establishment of export
controls by the requesting country would only be a "minimum step" toward
the satisfaction of this requirement; 8 5 and it must appear that the requesting
country has not only passed laws, but is making good faith efforts at enforcing
those laws. 186 Undoubtedly, this requirement is intended to prevent the United
176. 123 Cong. Rec. H11,068 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1977).
177. Implementing Bill, supra note 175, § 2; see note 131 supra and accompanying text.
178. Implementing Bill, supra note 175, § 3.
179. Id. § 7.
180. While the bilateral agreements may only be entered into with parties to the UNESCO
Convention,. multilateral action need only involve at least one State Party. Id. § 2(a). This
recognizes the fact that the illicit art trade involves many countries, 1977 Hearings, supra note 8,
at 19, some of whichhave shown little interest in becoming State Parties, id. at 31.
181. Implementing Bill, supra note 175, § 2(a).
182. Id.
183. H.R. Rep. No. 615, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977) [hereinafter cited as House Report].
184. Implementing Bill, supra note 175, § 2.
185. House Report, supra note 183, at 6.
186. Id.
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States from being relied upon as the enforcement agent of foreign cultural
property laws.
8 7
The third prerequisite is a finding that the implementation of import
restrictions would be of substantial benefit in deterring the pillaging of the
foreign patrimony, and that any less drastic action is unavailable.118 The bill
thus provides that restricting the flow of cultural materials into this country
shall only be a measure of last resort in the effort to save another nation's
cultural patrimony. 189 This particular requirement addresses itself to the
widespread belief that curtailing the flow of art into this country will only
divert the illicit trade to other art-importing nations and will, therefore, have
little deterrent effect on that trade.190
The final condition to any Presidential action in this area requires that any
restrictions imposed be consistent with the interests of legitimate cultural
exchange.1 91 This is in keeping with this country's previous responses to the
illicit art trade which have consistently sought to avoid excessive controls that
might impede lawful access to foreign cultural materials. 19 2 Before entering
into any agreement limiting the importation of cultural material into this
country, the President is urged by the terms of the bill to obtain a commit-
ment from the requesting nation to allow such exchanges as would not
jeopardize its cultural patrimony. 93 This provision anticipates that many of
the countries which may seek American assistance under the bill will be
countries that, like Mexico, do not allow the exportation of any historic
cultural material whatsoever.19
4
If an emergency situation arises with respect to a State Party's cultural
patrimony, and that country requests American assistance, the President is
authorized to apply import restrictions unilaterally without engaging in any
formal negotiations with a State Party. '95 The bill defines three situations that
qualify as an "emergency,"'1 96 and further states that no restrictions may be
imposed without a finding that their application would reduce the incentive
for the pillaging.
197
187. See id.
188. Implementing Bill, supra note 175, § 2.
189. House Report, supra note 183, at 6.
190. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
191. Implementing Bill, supra note 175, § 2(a)(4).
192. See notes 133, 148, 164-67 supra and accompanying text.
193. Implementing Bill, supra note 175, § 2(a).
194. House Report, supra note 183, at 5.
195. Implementing Bill, supra note 175, § 3. Any such restrictions are limited to an effective
duration period of two years, or until a bilateral or multilateral agreement is concluded with the
nation concerned, whichever period is shorter. Id. The section two agreements have an initial
effective period of five years, but can be extended at the will of the President. Id. § 2(b).
196. An emergency is deemed to exist if: (1) the material in jeopardy from pillage is of a newly
discovered, historically important type, or (2) the material originates from a site connected with
an important culture whose survival is at serious risk, or (3) the material is from the remains of a
particular civilization, the record of which is in jeopardy of crisis proportions. Id. § 3(a).
197. Id.
1978] 1197
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
C. The Cultural Property Advisory Committee
It is apparent that the proposed bill vests the executive branch with consider-
able discretion in combating the illicit market for cultural property in this
country. This feature has caused a good deal of concern among art collectors and
dealers that the bill will be used to promote "interests far removed from the
protection of art or the preservation of archaeological sites.' 98 Indeed, the State
Department has openly advocated the implementation of import controls for the
advancement of foreign relations. 199 Consequently, in an effort to offset such
potential abuse, the bill provides for the establishment of the Cultural Property
Advisory Committee, 200 which consists of nine experts appointed by the Presi-
dent from among nominations submitted by specified professional organizations
in the field. The Committee, representing museum, archaeological, dealer, and
academic interests, is to submit to the President views and recommendations
concerning any actions to be taken under the bill.
20 1
The concern that cultural importation might be made subject to political
vagaries is not entirely assuaged by the establishment of the Cultural Property
Advisory Committee, since the committee's recommendations are not in any way
binding upon the President. His only obligation is to consider the committee's
proposals 20 2 and to report to Congress any departures from those recommenda-
tions. 20 3 Even so, the State Department, which may be expected to administer
the provisions of the bill, 204 opposes the establishment of the Advisory Commit-
tee, because it believes that "this is a matter that can be best left to the Presi-
dent under general guidance from the Congress. '20 5
D. Enforcement Provisions
Once the President decides to apply import restrictions under a section three
emeregency action or a section two agreement, the Secretary of the Treasury,
after consulting with the Secretary of State, is required to promulgate a list
specifiying what archaeological and ethnological objects are covered. 20 6 Any
material so designated shall not be allowed to enter the United States unless
accompanied by an export certificate issued by the State Party. 20 7 Importation
will, however, be allowed even without a certificate if the consignee presents
198. 1977 Hearings, supra note 8, at 33 (statement of Mr. Ewing).
199. Id. at 81.
200. Implementing Bill, supra note 175, § 5.
201. Id. § 5(b), (f).
202. The President is required to consider these recommendations if they are submitted to
him within 120 days from the time he furnishes the committee with information concerning a
proposed bilateral or multilateral agreement, or 60 days from the time he furnishes information
on proposed unilateral action. Id. §§ 2(c)(3), 3(c)(2).
203. Id. § 2(d).
204. 1977 Hearings, supra note 8, at 32 (statement of Mr. Ewing).
205. Id. at 81.
206. Implementing Bill, supra note 175, § 4. This same procedure is utilized under the
Pre-Columbian Act. See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
207. Implementing Bill, supra note 175, § 6(a). The certificate requirement can be satisfied by
any documentation certifying that the object was not exported illegally. Id.
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satisfactory evidence that the material was exported from the State Party at least
ten years before the date of entry into the United States, that no American citizen
or permanent resident had acquired an interest in the material over such period,
and that the State Party had fair notice of the location of the material.208
The ten-years abroad provision is yet another example of this country's
interest in excluding foreign cultural material only where it serves to deter the
illicit trade in such material. The ten-year period between the time an object
is removed from a foreign country and the time it can be brought into the
United States market is a considerable discouragement to the looting of that
object. After this period, however, it is considered that the material has been
outside the country of origin for so long that its exclusion from the United
States "would no longer serve to deter pillage and would unnecessarily deny
access to the American viewing public." 20 9
Importation will also be allowed without a certificate if the consignee
presents satisfactory evidence that the material was exported from the State
Party on or before the listing by the Secretary of the Treasury.2 10 If, however,
the consignee does not meet the requirements for importation, the customs
official is required to take custody of the material and send it to a bonded
warehouse for storage at the risk and expense of the consignee. 2 "1 If the
necessary documentation is still not presented within 90 days, the material
becomes subject to seizure and judicial forfeiture.2 12 The person attempting
the illegal importation can apply for a remission or mitigation of this penalty
under the Tariff Act of 1930;213 otherwise, any material so forfeited is to be
208. Id. § 6(b). "Satisfactory evidence" consists of a declaration under oath by the consignor
and consignee which (1) states that the material was exported from the State Party at least ten
years before, (2) names all those who had an interest in the material during this period and
declares that they are not citizens or permanent residents of the United States, and (3) shows
compliance with regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury regarding fair notice to the
State Party of the location of the material after its export from that country, together with
certified copies of export documentation. Id. § 6(c)(1). Fair notice of the location of the material
can be in the form of public exhibition or publication. Id. § 6Lb)(2)(A)(ii).
209. House Report, supra note 183, at 14. The provision against any American interest in the
material during this period was inserted at the request of the State Department in order to avoid
the possibility that "some U.S. persons may acquire the object and leave it abroad until the 10
year period has expired and thus circumvent this provision." 1977 Hearings, supra note 8, at 83.
210. Implementing Bill, supra note 175, § 6(b)(2)(B). In this context, "satisfactory evidence"
consists of one or more declarations under oath that the material was exported prior to such date,
together with certified documents of exportation such as bills of sale, exhibition catalogs, copies of
publication, and export or import documents. Id. § 6(c)(2).
211. Id. § 6(b).
212. The 90-day period can be extended by the Secretary of the Treasury "for good cause
shown." Id. A museum can apply to the Secretary for permission to take possession of any
material seized under the act pending a final determination of whether there was a violation. Id.
§ 8.
213. See note 170 supra. The bill explicitly incorporates "[aill provisions of law relating to
seizure, judicial forfeiture and condemnation for violation of the customs laws .. ." Implementing
Bill, supra note 175, § 9(a). This includes "the right to full court review to decide all questions of
law and fact involved." House Report, supra note 183, at 15.
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offered for return to the country of origin. 2 14
When the importation is violative of the section seven prohibition concern-
ing material stolen from a State Party's museum or monument, 2 15 the forfei-
ture provisions also apply. However, in this case, the provisions of the bill
might entitle the claimant to just compensation from the aggrieved State
Party. This would be in accord with the UNESCO Convention 2 1 6-which the
bill is designed to implement-and would also be consistent with laws in this
country that protect some good faith purchasers who buy from persons
having a voidable title. 2 17 Specifically, the bill provides that if the claimant
establishes a valid title as against the institution from which the property was
stolen, no forfeiture shall be decreed unless the State Party pays him just
compensation. 21 8 If the claimant cannot establish such title, but can establish
that he is a bona fide purchaser for value, forfeiture shall not be decreed
unless the State Party pays compensation equal to the value paid by the
claimant. 21 9 If the United States, however, establishes that the State Party, as
a matter of reciprocity or as a matter of its own law, would return a stolen
cultural object without requiring compensation, a bona fide purchaser will not
be compensated. 220
The proposed bill will apply to very broadly defined types of materials, 22 1
allowing the President considerable room in implementing measures to fit
situations as they arise. However, despite the fact that no actual controls
could be applied without the promulgation of more specific listings, the
general threat of seizure and forfeiture contained in the bill may have the
undesirable effect of deterring many legitimate imports. 222 But even if only
the designated imports are deterred, there is widespread concern that the
provisions of the bill will result in a serious loss of cultural treasures to the
United States while the illicit trade is able to continue unmolested in other
major art-importing nations of the world. 223 The House Ways and Means
Committee recognized this as a "legitimate" concern but insisted that "the
United States should take a moral stand and exercise its leadership . . .
214. As in the Pre-Columbian Act, supra notes 160-72 and accompanying text, the foreign
government must agree to pay the expenses of such return. Otherwise, the material is to be
disposed of according to the United States Customs laws. Implementing Bill, supra note 175, §
9(b).
215. Id. § 7.
216. See note 138 supra.
217. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (a transferor can convey good title even if he himself
acquired the goods through larcenous fraud).
218. Implementing Bill, supra note 175 § 9(c).
219. Id.
220. Id. Reciprocity must be demonstrated by a government decree, proclamation, written
commitment, written opinion, or other written document. House Report, supra note 183, at 16.
221. Implementing Bill, supra note 175, § 15(2).
222. 1977 Hearings, supra note 8, at 56 (statement of Mr. Rueppel)
223. See note 119 supra and accompanying text. "The American public will have made a
costly and yet totally unnecessary sacrifice in terms of the cultural enrichment of this country."
1977 Hearings, supra note 8, at 31 (statement of Mr. Ewing).
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irrespective of whether other countries continue to tolerate such illicit
trade."224 This position, however, is clearly inconsistent with the explicit
conditions in the bill that no restrictions are to be implemented by the
President without a determination that the action would serve to deter the
pillaging of the material. 225
VII. THE POLICY CONFLICT
Over the past decade, the emergence of an American policy toward foreign
cultural property has become rather clear. This country, more than any other
major art-impofting nation, has shown itself committed to aiding other na-
tions in their efforts to save their cultural patrimony from the destruction of
an illicit art trade. At the same time, in its approach to the problem, the
United States has not by any means abandoned the interests of legitimate
cultural exchange. Congress has persistently indicated that it has no intention
of imposing any across-the-board restrictions on cultural imports. Rather,
restrictive measures are to be very selective, screening out only that material
which is of "outstanding importance to the national patrimony."2 26
The United States has further shown an unwillingness to make long-term
commitments in excluding any particular type of cultural object. The Pre-
Columbian Act 227 and the proposed implementation of the UNESCO Con-
vention 228 both revolve around a plan of discretionary restrictions that are to
be applied only on an ad hoc basis by the executive branch. When the
Prelinminary Draft of the UNESCO Convention would have required par-
ticipating nations to exclude cultural imports according to the dictates of
exporting nations, the United States" 'resisted vehemently' "in favor of its own
discretionary approach. 229 This country refused to abdicate to other nations
the right to decide what cultural material should be available to its citizens. In
recommending passage of the bill to implement the UNESCO Convention,
the House Ways and Means Committee stated its intention to "ensure that the
United States will not automatically enforce through import controls whatever
export prohibitions are established by other States Party to protect their
cultural patrimony. ' 23 0 The Committee believed that a foreign country should
not be able "merely to rely upon the United States and other countries to
enforce its export controls. ' ' 23
1
Despite all this, under United States v. McClain, 232 foreign governments
will be able to prevent Americans from acquiring cultural material simply by
224. House Report, supra note 183, at 8. See also 1977 Hearings, supra note 8, at 48
(statement of Mr. Brandt).
225. Implementing Bill, supra note 175, §§ 2(a)(3), 3(a).
226. Mexico Treaty, supra note 146, art. I, § (1)(a).
227. See pt. V(D) supra.
228. See pt. VI supra.
229. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 997 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1977); see notes 130-33 supra
and accompanying text.
230. House Report, supra note 183, at S.
231. Id. at 6.
232. 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977).
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declaring their ownership of that material. Regardless of what measures
Congress is considering, or what lists are promulgated by the executive
branch under the Pre-Columbian Act or the proposed bill, the United States
will have to give force to any such foreign decree by prosecuting those who
import the foreign property into this country. This places the United States
under precisely those obligations that it has always resisted.
The McClain result was largely due to the deference accorded to foreign
decrees under the American Act of State Doctrine. The Act of State Doctrine
does not, however, require American courts to recognize the validity of any
and all foreign governmental decrees.2 33 Neither the inherent nature of
sovereignty nor the obligations of international law compel such recogni-
tion;234 the mere fact that a controversy involves matters of foreign relations
does not in and of itself prevent a court of law from disposing of that case on
its merits.235
A foreign act of state has been denied recognition in American courts, for
instance, where such recognition would have been "deeply inconsistent" with
the public policy of this country. 23 6 Foreign divorce decrees, for example,
have often been invalidated for this reason. 23 7 Accordingly, in cases where the
legitimate exchange of cultural material is threatened by another country's
broad declarations of ownership of such property, American courts could
conceivably look to Congressional expressions of policy 238 as a basis for
deciding title on the merits rather than according to the foreign decree. As a
general rule, however, courts in this country have been extremely reluctant to
apply public policy in this manner. 239 In fact,. in a recent application of the
233. See generally Comment, Rationalizing the Federal Act of State Doctrine and Evolving
Judicial Exceptions, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 295 (1977).
234. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421 (1964).
235. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). However, the more important the implications
to foreign relations, the more the aggrieved party should look to political, not judicial, channels
for relief. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); Shapleigh v. Mier,
299 U.S. 468, 471 (1937).
236. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 447 (1964) (White, J., dissenting);
A. Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law 118 (1943). Foreign laws can be denied
effect in United States courts even if they are of "obvious political and social importance to the
acting country." 376 U.S. at 447.
237. See, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955).
238. See Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960)
("[I]t is the duty of the federal courts to accept as law the latest expression of policy made by the
constitutionally authorized policy-making authority.').
239. Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflic of Laws, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 969, 972
(1956). Public policy is frequently hard to define or delimit. Enunciation of what policy requires
comes close to being a political function and, therefore, is avoided by courts of law. See
A. Nussbaum, supra note 236, at 119. Public policy plays at much greater role in the choice of law
rules of Continental Europe than it does in this country. Id. at 112. One American commentator
proposes that public policy should override the Act of State Doctrine primarily in cases involving
the deprivation of human rights rather than purely economic rights. Simson, The Public Policy
.Doctrine in Choice of Law: A Reconsideration of Older Themes, 1974 Wash. U.L.Q. 391,
408-12.
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Act of State Doctrine, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that
American courts should decline to question the validity of foreign expropria-
tions of property no matter how offensive to the public policy of this country
such expropriations might be. 240
It appears, then, that when a foreign government enacts a law designed to
prevent Americans from acquiring even privately owned cultural material
within its borders, American courts cannot deny the validity of that law solely
because it contravenes the express policy interests of the United States. This
does not mean that legal precedent leaves this country with no other choice
but to accept the foreign decrees of national ownership without exception. An
American court of law might deny recognition to a foreign act of state if the
executive branch has articulated an intention that it should do so.2 '* The
State Department, which already has been very active in formulating Amer-
ican policy in this area,2 42 could issue a statement to the effect that transac-
tions in private cultural property should not be disturbed in this country
because of foreign national treasury laws. It is unlikely, however, that such a
statement would be issued. The State Department's interest in art law is
primarily motivated by its interest in cultivating good foreign relations. 43
Recognition of Mexican national treasury laws, for instance, will undoubtedly
be a factor in continued cooperation by that country in controlling the flow of
drugs and stolen automobiles across our borders. 244 The United States execu-
tive branch would be extremely reluctant to jeopardize this cooperation by
invalidating the Mexican cultural laws.
In short, the United States faces a genuine dilemma regarding the future
importation of foreign cultural materials. Principles of American jurispru-
dence, as well as the realities of international coexistence, dictate that this
country cannot cavalierly ignore legal decrees issuing from foreign sovereigns.
On the other hand, giving full recognition to foreign cultural legislation will
seriously threaten American access to the world's cultural patrimony.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As with most of today's valuable resources, the world's store of cultural
property is in critical need of conservation. This Comment has discussed the
240. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 436-37 (1964). In this case, the
Castro regime confiscated a shipload of sugar in retaliation for the United States Government's
reduction of the Cuban sugar quota.
241. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). Bernstein v.
N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam); A. Ehrenzwcig, A
Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 171 (1962). In Bernstein, where this principle was first applied,
the Second Circuit declined to recognize a confiscation of property by the Nazi Government after
the State Department advised that American courts should not validate such acts. In the First
Nat'l City Bank case, however, where the United States Supreme Court had occasion to consider
the Bernstein exception, only a plurality of three Justices expressed their approval of it, see 406
U.S. 759, 768 (1972), while the two concurring and four dissenting Justices rejected it, see id. at
773 (Douglas, J., concurring), id. (Powell, J., concurring), id. at 776-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
242. See note 162 supra and accompanying text.
243. See note 198 supra and accompanying text.
244. Nafziger, supra note 30, at 71-72.
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legal response of the United States to that crisis and has pointed out the conflict
between that response and the excessively restrictive measures of art-
exporting countries such as Mexico. Although the United States policy of
legitimate cultural exchange is being thwarted by legislative schemes abroad,
this country can and should exercise its influence as the world's major art-
importing nation to secure more reasonable policies from the countries con-
cerned. Effective regulation cannot be accomplished through unilateral action
alone. Experience has shown, rather, that control is best effected when
prudent restrictions are implemented at the situs of import as well as within
the country of origin.
The proposed legislation recognizes that reciprocity is essential to control-
ling the international trade in cultural materials. The bill expressly urges the
President to use United States cooperation as a bargaining tool in procuring
from other countries reasonable policies that would be both favorable to the
cultural interests of the United States and protective of important cultural
properties abroad. 245 If, however, such influence is not brought to bear, the
principles applied in United States v. McClain24 6 may easily become the
means through which foreign governments will be able to decide sua sponte what
-if any-cultural material shall be available to Americans.
Michael S. Blass
245. See notes 193-94 supra and accompanying text.
246. See notes 53-99 supra and accompanying text.
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